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1T·J 'l'HE SUPf.tEr~IE COURT
c_)F rfHE Sl-ii'I'_~J OF UTAH
S1\ LT l.u\KE. CITY. a .:\Iuni<:ipal
Corporation of the Sb.L~' of LTbdi,

AvpcllanL r111d PlaiJ1liff.
vs.

HOUSE ..:\THLg'i'lC
CL l TB arnl TIIE UNIYl~RSlTY
CLUB,
Resvondents and Defendants.

'i'U\\'NE

Case No.
10640

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ST_ATEl\IENT OF THE NAT URE OF
THE CASE
Tlii.s is a11 adion brought by the plaintiff and appellant for a judgment against the respondents and defend<ints for a li<:ense fee to operate a private club restaurant.
Lo\\er co11rt granted a stmmrnry judgment in favor
(If th'. defendants and responde11ts and against tbe
pi:tmliff au(l appellant.

l

RELIEF SOCGH'J'

O_~i

,c\PPE_,\J,

The pbiutiff and appellaEL ~>t:eks a ren:rsa] u/ ::.
summary judgment and that the case be remaudc; i
the lower court with instructions to enter a j ud;;· :, ;
for the a ppcllant as prayed for in its an~ended cuJ!iplaint.

STA'l'El\IENT OF FL\.CTS
A stipulation of the facts involved in the

c:~se

:,::

entered into by and behveen the plaintiff and defe1HLu: 1
on the 18th day of November, 1965 (R-9), as foll<n,·.
"Comes now the plaintiff by and through its attmney, A. J.H. _Marsden, and the defendants by and tl1rou~.:
their attorney, Richard R. \Vilkins, and stipulate:) b
the truthfulness of the following facts:
1. Plaintiff is a municipal corporation seck'.ng

11

impose a license fee on each of the def endaEts urnler
Section 20-2-62 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lah
City, Utah, 1955, which is an ordinance allowing the
plaintiff to impose a license fee on restaurants. 'Ji11.
plaintiff claims the right to license the defendants under
Section 20-2-62 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt I,akt
City, Utah, 1955, by virtue of Sections 10-8-39. 111·
8-80 and 10-8-81, Utah Code Annotated 1953, a1
amended. rriviug t:ities the riffht 1:0 rc.:_:·u1ate social dllh·
)

.._~:.,

(_,

L_,

2. 'J'he defernla11L; aad each of thern are social dul·

.
d as nu;1-,:,'.ront
"' C.1rpora t'ions, l'iceuse<
. l , U0'1, 1'
incorporate
1

2

rcg1tlated by the State of Utah ullder Seetious
ii 1; Ll I, :t!l(l l\H)-18.:2 awl HH;-13.3, Utah Code Au1 :!)I a tc·d
I U.5:3, as amended, aud each has not paid a
lf«~tauraut liceuse fee for the year 1965.

: :i

.lii(l

;). That the defendants and each of them, prepare,
.,~·nc awl sell food and drink only to club members
:111d their guests at their rcspediYe place of operatioHS
iu Salt L<1ke City, Utah.
U..:\Tlj:u this 18th <lay of November, HlG5."

\VATKINS, \VILKINS &
Hichard R. \V ilkins

RO~INEY

Attorney for Defendants

:_wo

South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION
A. M. J\1arsden
Attorney for Plaintiff
-HJ City & County Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
Arguments were had before the court on the respeclJYe positions of the litigant parties and briefs filed
b~, caelJ. (H. 13-17 and R. 18-2-1<). The court made
•t:1d entered its memorandum decision agaiust the plaint:Ii' a 11d i 11 fa ,·or of the defendants on the 25th day of
A Jnil, HHii) ( H. 25-:28), awl a judgment thereafter
011 tlic ] \lth day of l\fay, 1966 (R. 29), later amended,

3

but without chmuring· the effect of the J· ud(J'ment
. ,
0
(tli1l
memorandum decision already entered.
L..1

Notice of appeal was filed on the 20th day of l\Iay,
1966 to the Supreme Conrt of Utah by the plaiutiJ»

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
SALT LAKE CITY _MAY IlVIPOSE A HESTAURANT LICENSE AND CHARGE A L
CENSE FEE UPON THE DEFENDANTS
WHO ARE PRIVATE NONPROFIT INCORPORATED SOCIAL CLUBS.
The question to be briefed for the court is whethe1
or not Salt Lake City, under the provisions of its ordinance, Sec. 20-2-62 of the Revised Ordinances of Sall
Lake City, Utah, 1955 (now Chapter 14 of Title 211
of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utali.
1965) may collect a restaurant license fee from tl11
defendants ·who are priYate nonprofit incorporated social
clubs.
The Legislature has granted the City authorih
to collect a license fee from restaurants under Sec. 10·
8-39, Utah Code Annotated 1953, and has also couferred authority upon tthe Citr to license and regulate
private social clubs whether incorporated or not, umk
Sec. 10-8-81, Utah Code Annotated 1953.

4

tlwt they are wit subject to
,i 1 !1i·1·11-.;;11g ordinanee .. , of Salt Lake City since they
:ire 11ut engage<l in carrying on a restaurant business.
! l1l· dcfe11da11ts cl:i:111

it lias beeu stated in :2U Am. J ur., Inkeepers,
St,c. !J, Page 1:2, that "the term restaurant has no defi-

11itc legal meaning unless defined

by statute."

\Ve have no statute in this state defining the term
'restaurant." Therefore, it does uot necessarily follow
tiwt the defcnd:mts are excluded from such term since
lbey sef'.'e, prepare and sell both food and drink aud
('Ollle within the terms and definition of restaurants
1uHlt:r tbc plaintiff's ordinance cited above provides:
"The term 'restaurant' as used herein shall be
dehnc<l to be any place where food or drink is
prepared, served, or offered for sale or sold for
liuniall ('.Ollsumption on or off the premises."
Sec. 10-8-81, Utah Code Annotated 1953, proYides as follows:
''They (cities) may regulate all social clubs,
recreational associations, athletic associations
uud kindred associations, whether incorporated
or not, which maintain club rooms or regular
'.nt·etihg rooms within the corporate limits of the

city."

Our Supreme Court has had occasion to determine

linetol'or'' the proposition as to whether or not the
, \ pru;:-; power of the city to regulate conduct includes
l; c: rower to license. That was determined in the case

5

of Provo Cit;l} v. Provo ftf.eat rmd Packiny Cu., 41) l't:,.
528, 165 P. 477. That decision was based upon the 191.,
Session Laws of Utah, Sec. 206, which in part pruYidt\
as follows:
"To provide for the place and manner of sali
of meats, poultry, fish, butter, cheese, brd, regc
tab~es, and all other provisions, and regulate tlic
sellmg of the same."
The court unanimously held as follffws :

" * * * properly speaking, a license fee or
license tax comes within and is based upon tJi,
police power of the state to regulate or to prr1·
hibit a particular business. * * * \Vhere power
is conferred to regulate a particular business or
calling the power to license is included within
the power to regulate."

1

In

McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Sec.
the author says:
3

USO.

" 'The prevailing rule is that under power to
regulate the municipal corporation may licern.
and charge a reasonable fee, to cover the expe1m
of regulation, especially concerning those m·cu·
pations wherein regulation and supervision ap·
pear necessary or desirable for the pubhc good

* * *' "

Any doubt as to whether or not specific power lrn 1
been conferred upon Salt Lake City by Sections 10·
8-39 and 10-8-81, Utah Code Annotated 19,5:-3, to regu·
late and license private social clubs for that part 111
their activities where they are engaged in preparing.

6

l(l sdliug food a1.d drink to their members
,,iii ,:.;·,,, •..,[~ a.-; restaurants, must be resolyed in fann·
.;/' tl1c City under Sec. 10-8-84<, Utah Code ..1.·Hmota~d
1 i.):$. This .'>tatule delegates the police power of the
.:t;iic lo llie <"ities of Utah.
lt is commoHly called
L('11t'!':1i i,{clfare Claw,c·.'' Bohn v. Sali Lo/,·e Cit.1;,
111 ,
, :' l '; ;d1 1n a11d 1~8, 8 P.id .:'ilH, 81 A.L.R. 215.
(

I

'

•

',~

.\

,' J

( '/1111/cs S. Hh,11111:, author of ~\Iunieipal Law, 1951
Ld;rtll. :·;1l':). -J.-g, pages 72 and 73, has this to say re-

1"anl:11g stt('.li welfare statutes:
"The emuneration of powers ;n specrnl ehartcr:; Oi' statutes go\·er11i11g m1m~cipal corporations
docs 11ot necessarily operate as a lirnitation or
l ~·~clt1sion of municipal powers not enumerated.
dw :;late lcgi:.;laturc, iu order to obviate the difficuli y of making specific enumenttiun ol' all
powers il intends lo delegate to the mullicipality,
ltstwily confers some power in genc.i'al terms.
[ 1ome rule charter enactments or amendments
uw y lie couched in the most general terms. The
purpose of a general welfare clause in a statute
i~' to exteild the powers of a municipality heyoncl
ilto:ie specifically cnumcraled to other things
whid1 arc necessary to accmnplish the purposes
of municipal government. Special charters arc
ol'ten conduded ·with a clause conferring general
a11thorit:,· to pass all ordinances which ma;· br
IH:'cessary for the promotion of the health, snfr:t~·
:111d ·,·.:elf:1re of tlie municipalitr wlii<'h arc uot
i;; ('1:i1ilid with the con.stitution or [•:Pner:il laws
, ,;· i iw -;late. The powers gra11te(l in a 1~e11er:d
11 cl i'.·1 r'L c~ause :ire as a nde desip;ned to cm if er
: '.er·; d]wr thau those specifieal1? mentioned;
0

7

but those specifically enumerated cannot be t,,
larged
and must not be extended bevolld
t'iii
.
.
or d mary scope of municipal authority or pur
poses, or conflict with the powers bestowed up
it by charter general laws or the constitution,

1, ,
1

"The courts have held, for example, that :
general grant of power conferred the followin·
unspecified powers to: regulate or prohibit ti;
sale of alcoholic beverages; levy special asse1.1
ments; issue bonds; pay bonuses to emvloyet1
and heroes; condemn land; protect public hcult/
regulate hours and conditions of labor for mu
nicipal work; pay dues to municipal leagues:
establish parks; provide police protection; !en
business, occupation, property and vehicle taxe.;
and establish a standard of time for the con<lur:i
of municipal affairs." (Emphasis added).
1

,

Our Supreme Court has held in the case of 811/:
Lake City v. 11owe, 106 P. 705, 37 Utah 170, as foJ.
lows ( headnotes 1 and 2) :
"Comp. Laws 1907, § 206, Subd. 44, authorize1
municipal corporations to regulate the sale u!
meats, fish, butter, and all other provisions. Sub·
division 45 authorizes them to provide for, anil
regulate, th(' inspection of meats, butter, etc..
and all other provisions. Subdivision 65 author·
izes regulations to secure the general health ol
the city, and prevent th~ introduction of c.on·
tagious disease, and subdivision 88 authonw
cities to pass all ordinances, and make all regu
lations necessary to preserye the health of tJ1,
inhabitants. J-!ELD, that a municipality 11:1·
authorized to enact an ordinance regulating th
inspection and sale of milk and making it n
1

1

8

offense to sell milk within the city without a
permit from the city food and dairy commissioner, though milk was not specificall,lj included
in the statutes as a subject of regulation, it being
induded in the term 'other provisions' in subdivisions 44 and 45, and the ordinance was also
authorized under the city's power under subdivisions 65 and 88 to enact ordinances for the
protection of health.
"The Legislature can confer police powers
upon a city over subjects included within existing statutes, and authorize it to prohibit and
punish by ordinance acts which are also prohibited and punishable by the statute."
It is the contention, therefore, of the plaintiff, that
111 order to protect the public health, it is necessary
that the city be empowered to license such establishments and that such power has been conferred by the
Legislature to do so in all of the statutes above cited
when construed together.

The right to protect the public health by license
and regulation is confirmed by the powers conferred
on city health departments under Sec. 26-15-44, Utah
Cude Annotated 1953, as amended.
CONCLUSION

It is, therefore, the conclusion of the plaintiff from
tlie foregoing statutes and cases cited, that Salt Lake
City is completely empowered and authorized to impose
a restamant license fee upon the defendants for that
9

part of their activities wherein they prepare, sene :1Iii\
sell to their members and guests, food and drink for (
i
human consumption.
Respectfully submitted,

HOl\IER HOLl\lGREN
City Attorney

A. M. MARSDEN
Assistant City Attorney
414 City and County Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
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